The Institute for War Studies believes that a ceasefire, a freeze of hostilities or an exit for the Russian president will not solve the conflict in Ukraine, arguing that only the defeat of the Kremlin will bring something bigger in the future prevent.
Reflecting on the motivations that led Russian President Vladimir Putin to invade Ukraine on February 24, 2022, and the ways out of the conflict, the authors of the Institute for War Studies (ISW), headquartered in Washington , that a ceasefire or Other negotiations that freeze the conflict under current conditions will be “much more beneficial” for the Kremlin than before, or a kind of Minsk III, in reference to the 2015 agreement between Ukraine, Russia, France and Germany to reduce tensions in eastern Ukraine.
“Such ‘peace’ will be no peace at all. It will simply be an opportunity for Russia to rebuild its military and economic power, divert Western attention, and try to mend the rifts in Ukrainian society and capitalize on it until it can. resumes its attacks,” write the authors of the article “Weakness is deadly: why Putin invaded Ukraine and how the war should end,” dated Sunday.
The idea of giving Putin some form of diplomatic exit and an opportunity to “save” conflicts, the text says, with the lessons of recent years, as the Kremlin leader has already created this exit for himself, “not because diplomacy convinced Putin to give up his persecution of Ukraine, but because he realized that freezing the front lines was his best option to maintain control over this country.
In 2014, during the pro-Russian uprisings in the Donbass, the ISW says, Putin overestimated Moscow’s support and its ability to create “a proxy force” in eastern Ukraine and underestimated Ukrainian resistance, thereby only partially gained control over Luhansk. and Donetsk regions instead of the six originally intended and for which the army was used.
“Putin quit in 2015 because he recognized that his military efforts had failed to restore full control over Ukraine, that he had reached the limits of Russian power and his own risk tolerance, and that an ongoing active conflict would require gambling on the launching an unprepared attack would require. “, says the ISW.
The acceptance of ‘a temporary setback to achieve his greater goal’ has been reflected in recent years, and also in the attempt to convert the military presence in Ukraine into political control of the country: ‘When that campaign failed, Putin resorts to massive invasions. “.
This reading leads the Institute’s authors to argue that a lasting end to the current conflict requires forcing Putin to accept defeat and making Putin understand that he cannot impose his will militarily nor bribe the neighboring country politically, neither can prevail diplomatically.
“As long as the Kremlin harbors hope for success – which any face-saving compromise deal would promote – it will continue to try to overcome its setbacks in ways that make another war very likely,” the authors (Nataliya Bugayova, Kateryna Stepanenko and Frederick W. Kagan) warn .
A new war would be bigger and even more dangerous and also ‘extremely expensive’ if Moscow were given time to rearm and prepare: ‘The demands to reduce the financial burden of aid to Ukraine now simply bring greater risks and costs for the future.’
“True peace,” the ISW concludes, can only consist of supporting Kiev and “inflicting an unequivocal military defeat on Russia,” to rebuild Ukraine “into an army and a society so strong and resilient that no future Russian leader will see an opportunity like this.” those whom Putin misperceived in 2014 and 2022.”
If current leaders choose the opposite option and if the West is lured into the illusion of compromise, “this may end the pain for now, but only at the cost of much greater pain later,” and Putin will send that signal interpret it as a signal of surrender.
“And surrender emboldens him to attack again,” they warn, and “this war can only end not when Putin thinks he can save face, but when he knows he cannot win.”
Before unleashing his “special military operation” in Ukraine in 2022, Putin saw weakness in the West and NATO, according to ISW, but missed his story about an alleged threat from the Atlantic Alliance against Moscow, as well as the attempt to politically manipulate Kiev and divide its members.
“Vladimir Putin did not invade Ukraine in 2022 because he was afraid of NATO. He invaded because he believed that NATO was weak, that his attempts to regain control of Ukraine through other means had failed, and that he would install a pro-Russian government in Kiev. would be safe and convenient.”
Moreover, the goal was not to defend itself against any threat, but to “expand Russia’s power, eradicate the Ukrainian state and destroy NATO, goals he still pursues,” all as a result of a series of events between 2019 and 2020 that led him to conclude a historic opportunity to restore control over Kiev since the Euromaidan uprising in 2014, the escape of pro-Russian Uranian President Viktor Yanukovych, who gave way to a pro -western regime.
“Putin’s condemnation stemmed from the Kremlin’s failed attempts to force Ukraine to submit to Russia’s demands, Putin’s immersion in an ideological and self-reflexive bubble during the Covid-19 pandemic, and Western responses to global events and Russian threats in 2021,” analyzes the ISW noted that no diplomatic offer from the West or Kiev, “other than surrendering to their maximalist demands,” would have convinced him to give up the historic opportunity he thought he had.
In the ISW text, Putin was always less concerned about the military threat from NATO than about his loss of control over Russia’s sphere of influence as a superpower in the former Soviet states and, even if they did not break with Moscow, in the alternative that the West could offer, such as ‘the ‘colour revolutions’ that so alarmed Putin’, his way of life, values and governance: ‘NATO and the West threatened Russia simply by existing’.
The ISW also seeks to deconstruct Ukraine’s ambition to join NATO, noting that the enshrinement of this goal in the Constitution and the recognition of Kyiv as a partner of improved opportunities in 2020 were not steps toward formal membership and that in fact the announcement of This statute “explicitly said that it does not prejudge any decisions on accession”, just like the 2008 Bucharest Declaration, which promised the Ukrainian and Georgian authorities paths to integration that never materialized.
According to the Institute, no diplomatic offer from the West, “other than renouncing Ukraine’s sovereignty and abandoning NATO principles,” would have prevented Putin from invading Ukraine, and only the threat of military intervention from the United States or NATO could have deterred Putin. , but ‘Washington has explicitly taken such a threat off the table’
The leader’s objectives remain unchanged, the ISW says, “nor has he shown any willingness to accept an inferior outcome because of a perceived impasse,” so “even if he has shown a willingness to move on along current lines To negotiate a ceasefire, Ukraine and the West would be foolish to accept it.”
Source: DN
