Does the current response to the Russian invasion of Ukraine show the West that unity remains unparalleled?
Three years ago, at the Munich Security Conference, the concept of “Westlessness” was discussed, that is, the idea that the “West” was so divided that the future should belong to China and Russia. As the book argues, the pandemic and Moscow’s war against Kiev prompted Washington and European capitals to respond and show their willingness to remain one of the main sources of the International Order. Moreover, the concept of ‘the West’ is now not merely geographical, but increasingly political, technological, financial and economic. The coming together of European countries, Washington, Canada and, for example, Japan on the fate of Ukraine has come as a great surprise to Moscow and Beijing.
Is the United States, now self-sufficient in energy, proving that predictions about its demise as a superpower were wrong?
Structural changes have been taking place in the field of energy for several years. These changes always have strategic consequences. Shale oil and shale gas, which are already ten years old, are a good example of this. Both enabled the US to gain more room for maneuver internationally, strengthen relations with its key allies and increase the competitiveness of its industry. However, production of shale oil and shale gas in the US is declining. We have been talking about the decline of the United States for decades. However, Washington continues to have very significant advantages over its rivals and adversaries. The question remains: will Washington’s geostrategic orientation remain internationalist? We do not know. This is a point we should keep in mind when assessing the risks we face in European countries.
Very vulnerable due to the covid-zero policy, with an economic growth of only 3% in 2022 and a declining population, is China still able to challenge US leadership?
I have doubts. Beijing is and will remain an indispensable capital in international politics. However, we continue to think about China in a very linear way, especially in economic terms. This trend should strengthen over the course of 2023 as China emerges from the most difficult phase of the pandemic. However, as the book argues, Beijing has made serious strategic mistakes since 2008. This will make it difficult to implement and achieve some of the main goals of the Communist Party of China.
Is war between the US and China likely, with Taiwan as the cause or the pretext?
The book proposes a model for analyzing international politics where the time variable is important. My argument is that China should peak economically and politically by the end of this decade. If so, the opportunity for Xi Jinping and the CCP seems much shorter than we think. Added to this is the centralization of power with the Chinese leader. On the other hand, in the United States, Japan, South Korea, Australia and European countries, the fate of Taipei is seen as essential to the defense of its interests and political values. In this context, a Chinese coercive campaign against Taiwan, or even its invasion, may become possible. The interpretation of variable time in Taipei, Beijing, Washington and Tokyo, domestic politics in all these countries and the assessment of power make Taiwan one of the most delicate and difficult issues in international politics.
How can the German and Japanese decision to sharply increase military investments be interpreted?
As a sign of the change in assessment that Tokyo and Berlin have of the historical period in which we live. Russia’s war against Ukraine and China’s increased ambition are a sign of the Thirty Years’ Crisis. Japan’s process of strategic reorientation, however, predates Berlin’s. For commercial and historical reasons, as well as strategic atrophy in recent decades, Germany should have more difficulty adapting than Japan. Angela Merkel and Olaf Scholz are not Shinzo Abe and Fumio Kishida.
Does this arms race resulting from the war against Ukraine bring new geopolitical uncertainty to the world?
Military investments are the result of the assessment of risks and opportunities made by major capitals in Asia, Europe and North America. From a technological, energetic, financial and military point of view, we have already entered a new historical era. The period that began in 1989/1991 ended and, as I argue in the book, the international system became unbalanced. We have reached a bifurcation point in history. It will take some time to arrive at a new system configuration.
Does the new vitality of NATO prevent the European Union from having its own military capability, or should this remain an objective?
The emotional response of European societies to the Russian invasion of Ukraine and the massive violence of Russian troops against Ukrainian civilians reminded us of the importance of NATO and the European Union. Vladimir Putin has made a double achievement: he is one of the agents of the creation of a new Ukraine and the re-establishment of the Atlantic Alliance and European integration. However, Moscow’s war against Kiev made the European countries too dependent militarily on Washington. This seems reckless on our part.
Do you see a way out of the war in Ukraine?
Not in the short term. From the point of view of Vladimir Putin, the regime he leads and the Russian Orthodox Church, this is an existential war. Your Russia can exist only with control over Kiev. Moscow remains an imperial capital and understands that this empire will be one of the sources of order in international politics. Ukraine will always be in danger as long as Putin leads Russia. For Kiev, this is also an existential war. The price paid in blood and destruction is the best proof of what is at stake for Ukrainian society and leadership. This is a country determined to secure its independence at all costs. The electoral cycle in Ukraine – there will be presidential elections in 2024 – will reinforce all this. The next few months are likely to be very violent. There we will see if Kiev will succeed – and at what cost in terms of manpower and equipment – to launch an offensive campaign that will allow it to regain its territory.
“There is clearly an ideological dimension between autocracies like China and Russia and democratic societies. Xi Jinping and Vladimir Putin have been clear on this.”
Can a Russia threatened with defeat be tempted by the nuclear option?
It all depends on the definition of defeat. One thing is a defeat that implies the continued existence of a pluralistic Ukraine from a political point of view and closer to Europe. Another is a Russian defeat that will see Kiev regain all its lost territory after February 24 last year. Finally, we have a scenario in which Kiev regains control of Crimea. Because of the political implications, both internal and external, the nuclear option should only make sense in a situation of existential danger to Putin’s Russia. The difficulty is that no one knows where that line is. Hence the tension in some European countries and in the United States between the need to ensure that Ukraine does not lose the war and at the same time avoid a major defeat for Russia.
Is there a dispute between the democratic world and the autocracies or is it all a struggle for power and influence between powers?
There is clearly an ideological dimension between autocracies such as China and Russia and democratic societies. Xi Jinping and Vladimir Putin have been clear on this. This has implications for the way they exercise power and influence. We have devalued this ideological dimension in Portugal, especially in relation to China. As history shows, the United States is also an ideological superpower. Of course, interests also remain very important. The big question is the hierarchy that liberal democracies must strategically create in terms of values and interests. Here the differences between the Biden administration and some of its allies are apparent.
Should Portugal strengthen its military capabilities within the scope of NATO and, while committed to the EU, prefer the traditional alliance with the United States and the United Kingdom after Brexit?
Yes. NATO and the European Union are absolutely fundamental alliances for the future of Portugal. During the Thirty Years Crisis, we must do everything we can to strengthen the role of these institutions. For geographical reasons, I think we should adopt a maritime strategy. However, as I argue in the book, our trajectory is not encouraging.
Has the current crisis returned strategic value to Base das Lajes?
When we talk about Base das Lajes, we think of the United States. We never thought about Portugal. This seems wrong to me. The Azores are national territory in the heart of the Atlantic Ocean. The essential point is knowing how we capitalize on its strategic value, regardless of Washington’s assessment of the Lajes base. The book contains a proposal to do this. As for Washington, its investments in maintaining the base’s logistics suggest it will continue to be relevant to its interests. That said, the importance of the base has clearly declined in recent decades. We continue to find it extremely difficult to accept this. It’s kind of like saying the cutest girl isn’t dating you anymore. The base is important for the self-esteem of the country and the Azores. In 2009, Washington made it clear that Lajes would become a secondary base on the Central Atlantic route until 2025. At the time, we made a serious mistake in terms of political judgment in Portugal on this subject. Today, the role of the base is similar to that of the fortress of S. João Baptista in the 16th and 17th centuries: supporting the transit of the maritime powerhouse to the south of Spain. If the evolution of the Thirty Years’ Crisis leads to an increase in the strategic importance of the Atlantic Ocean, the base could regain its importance. For now it is a military Sleeping Beauty.
Where is the story going?
Miguel Monjardino
Authors club 19 euros
383 pages
Source: DN
