There is a bold statement that opens the second chapter: February 24, 2022 will go down in history as a more relevant date than September 11 or November 9, 1989. Where does this certainty come from?
This is by far the most serious and complex moment since World War II. It is the event with the greatest global impact since then, causing more shock waves simultaneously and in more countries: financial, economic, political, energy, food security. It’s not a “world war”, but it has a huge global impact. And potential to generate more sustainable and disruptive change. It is in Ukraine that, since February 24, 2022, the new frontier of democratic Europe has been defined. It will not only be about the fate of Ukrainians: it will be about the fate of all of us Europeans.
The book emerges as a dissemination work on the war in Ukraine, but also reflects on the geopolitical implications, taking into account the role of the US and China. War breaks out between Moscow and Kiev. What about peace?
In an aggressive war, it only makes sense to talk about peace if we can put the word “fair” after it. A peace that allows the aggressor to keep part of the occupied territory would be a miserable peace in which the aggressor is rewarded and the aggressor’s submission accepted. It wouldn’t be acceptable. In this sense, peace must always be accompanied by the complete withdrawal of Russian troops from Ukraine and the cessation of hostilities. China wants to assert itself as a promoter of peace. It would be positive, but it is worrying that in the 12 points it presents it is never clear that Russia is an aggressor and has violated international law. On the other hand, Xi Jinping wants to be a mediator and has not yet spoken with either party, Zelensky, which is reprehensible to say the least. Putin understands Ukraine as a natural space of Russia and does not see it as an integral sovereignty separate from Russian space. And this, it must be explained, is in line with what he recently wrote in an essay in which he admitted: “I am increasingly convinced that Ukraine does not need the Donbass”. Putin has questioned Ukraine as it has existed until now. He believed that modern Ukraine exists only on Russian lands. Putin’s Russia wants a guarantee that Ukraine will not join NATO; but it wants more – it wants guarantees that NATO’s expansion to the east will be stopped; intends to freeze military infrastructure in the former republics of the USSR, not only in Ukraine; the withdrawal of intermediate and long-range missiles from Europe and the end of military aid to Ukraine. In a broader analysis, by provoking instability and undermining confidence in Kiev’s institutions, Putin will want a possible political shift to a pro-Russian government in Ukraine. Ukraine, on the other hand, has objective reasons to feel threatened in terms of sovereignty and territorial integrity, not only now, but since 2014. Both sides seem unable to back down: if Ukraine stops fighting, it will cease to be its own identity; if Putin ordered the withdrawal of troops from Ukraine, he risked not surviving at home. We are falling into an existential battle for both camps. Everything indicates that this will be a protracted war, one of attrition, possibly with phases of low intensity, as it has been in Donbass for nine years.
Source: DN
