Last weekend, the varnish came loose between number one and number two of the Transitional Council of Sovereignty (established after the coup that deposed dictator Omar Bashir in 2019), General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan and ‘semi-general’ Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo, respectively, in the popularly known as Hemetti. “Semi-General” as he was never a member of the National Army, but rather a charismatic leader in Darfur, with the ability to recruit and mobilize men, for the purposes of dictator Bashir. Here we can begin to perceive the principle of incompatibilities between these two protagonists of the current week.
How did you get here?
This is clearly a legacy of the last phase of the almost 30-year regime led by dictator Omar Bashir (1993-2019), since the Darfur war that started in 2003, gave him the initiative/solution to the various Janjaweed- militias from Darfur, in 2013 in a paramilitary unit called Forças de Apoyo Rapid (FAR). These were the supports that enabled stabilization in the east of the country, violently suppressing initiatives and wishes of secession along the long border with Chad and part of the border with the Central African Republic in the southwest. The FAR fulfilled its mission and was not immediately dismantled. On the contrary, they grew exponentially over the years and became a mercenary force in the service of Bashir, which he could use in neighboring regional conflicts, as happened in Yemen and Libya. This is where the numbers are impressive, as they started in 2013 with five to six thousand armed men, in 2016/17 they already sent 40 thousand men to the war in Yemen, in support of Saudi Arabia. When they returned, a thousand were immediately sent to Libya in support of Marshal Haftar. In other words, Bashir continued to instrumentalize the FAR, giving them missions abroad, extensive wartime experience, which he could also convert into a praetorian guard, when signs of overthrow appeared. These arrived in December 2018 through demonstrations against rising inflation and the cost of living. In April 2019, the National Army, led by also defense minister and Bashir’s vice president, General Ahmed Awad Ibn Auf, “took the rug” off the dictator and Ibn Auf proclaimed himself president of the country, suspended the constitution and a process of transition from military to civilian powers begins that same year, with the appointment of Abdalla Hamdok as Prime Minister (PM).
The FAR’s role in the 2019 coup was to support the actions of the National Army, namely in the repression of the pro-Bashir demonstrations that followed and in June these paramilitaries became even more famous for the “Khartoum massacre”, counted with 100 dead and very likely thrown into the Nile with another 100, tied to stones and bricks and never found nor officially accounted for. This “war pornography” had its bright side, as it enabled the establishment of the Transitional Sovereignty Council in the following month, August. This Council included the military, civilian opposition and other living forces of Sudan such as trade unions and professional associations, a legislative/executive body that “ruled” Sudan until the next coup.
This is followed by the October 2021 coup with current rivals Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo, the “Hemetti of the FAR”, side by side with Abdel Fattah al-Burhan who had meanwhile replaced Ibn Auf at the head of the Military Transitional Council. The reasons for this return to the “military absolute” in Sudan were due to the pressure exerted by “Freedom and Change”, the main opposition aggregator and spokesperson, within the Transitional Council of Sovereignty to allow the transfer of power entirely to civilians. On the other hand, the economic reforms of the caretaker government of Prime Minister Abdalla Hamdok again brought the population to the streets in protest. When there is more of the same for both military and civilian parties, guns prevail! For example, Prime Minister Hamdok was arrested and dismissed and the Transitional Sovereignty Council suspended, which in reality had only been created under international pressure, to prevent Sudan from becoming a pariah state, just as Afghanistan had once been forgotten in time and space.
Al-Burhan announces the formation of a government of technocrats and sets a July 2023 deadline for holding new elections.
Reasons for the 2023 “Easter Coup”.
The determination of this date for the elections will be signed in 2022 between military and civilians. A new agreement for a transfer of power was signed two weeks ago, but a “hot potato” called Forças de Apoyo Rapid (FAR) and its integration into the National Army began to block the whole process. Faced with this, the pragmatic al-Burhan declared the FAR a rebel group, thinking “kill two birds with one stone with a single statement”. It removed from the scene a rival who commanded 100,000 armed men and sent an official and unofficial army underground (it was declared a regular force in 2015 and a law was passed in 2017 designating the FAR as an independent security force), which could bring it forward any time.
An important fact to understand the dynamics between these two armies is the fact that the FAR has been managed by the secret services from the beginning, although in the field they have always been under the command of a member of the National Army. This detail lifts the veil for experts on the ever-existing rivalry between security forces, under the same banner, and the “hives” resulting from the administration of conflicting wills.
On the other hand, Alaaeldin Nugud, from the Sudanese Professional Association, a signatory of the latest agreement in 2023, says that it is very contradictory regarding the transition process as one of the parties was not really committed to the transition. General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan, the current “CEMGFA”, said he was committed and signed the document, again not to make Sudan a new pariah, but in fact what he wanted to impose in the signed text was total independence of the military from the decision-making process without civilian approval. For Nugug, the “Hemetti of the FAR” was in good faith, because the continued pacification and the path towards a more democratic Sudan would guarantee the preservation of all that he had personally acquired and accumulated since Bashir’s time. Namely gold mines, ranching and other infrastructure related to both companies. Hemetti even said, before signing, “I hope we all really commit ourselves to the path to democracy,” a clear sign that he knew his rival al-Burhan was not on the same wavelength.
On the other hand, the importance and influence of the Muslim Brotherhood within the National Army and in the television and radio networks was decisive for the failure of the process, as they openly said that it was not an agreement to be fulfilled. For this reason, Mariam Al Mahdi, leader of the National Umma Party (of the Islamic Nation), calls an “expected surprise”, adding to the pressure of the Muslim Brotherhood, the pressure of the former followers of the dictator Omar Bashir, insisting that the 2023 deal not be signed justified it with its corporate interests, which would be jeopardized if it moved to democracy.
Right now we have Hemetti calling al-Burhan an “Islamist assassin” and al-Burhan calling the FAR a militia. The ingredients for the start of a general civil war in Sudan are on the table and there was an episode on Sunday confirming this prospect. Despite both sides agreeing on a three-hour ceasefire, between 3 and 6 p.m., proposed by the United Nations, for the evacuation and support of civilians, the same was not respected. Another symptom of the pre-civil war is that fighting, including aerial bombardment, is increasingly spreading to residential areas rather than military areas, or areas of strategic importance to both sides.
Risk of regional contamination
Mention beforehand that there are neighboring countries interested in this chaos, as is the case in the case of Egypt of General Abdul Fatah al-Sissi, whose politicians and military never supported the 2022 and 2023 agreements. Because the “dictator elected” is not interested in seeing a democracy literally blossom “under his beard”, just as Pakistan was never interested in an Afghanistan different from what it is today! On the other hand, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, supported by the FAR in the war in Yemen, will be more interested in promoting the democratic process, a way to maintain the existence of the FAR, as well as the excellent relationship they have maintained with their leader Hemetti. . In terms of regional contagion, Chad has already declared a border reinforcement, predicting the flight of fighters and refugees into its territory, as well as the possibility of fighting spreading into Chad. North Darfur, bordering a corner of southeastern Libya, plus the FAR’s ties to Marshal Haftar, could lead to war again in an area it has been waiting for until the outcome of events in Ukraine . Increasing instability in South Sudan, Ethiopia and Eritrea will also need to be taken into account as this conflict evolves. Finally, there is suspicion, speculation about the FAR’s ties to the Wagner Group, which is also right next door, in the Central African Republic.
I take this x-ray from my satellite and finish by paraphrasing Alaaeldin Nugud of the Sudanese Professional Association, who summarizes the complexities of Sudan 2023 this way: “Neither the National Army is a National Army nor the Rapid Support Forces are a National Army! “
Political scientist/Arabist
www.maghreb-machrek.pt (under repair)
Source: DN
