The Wagner Group (GW) has for years played the functions of Moscow’s armed wing abroad in an ambiguous and informal manner, a status that has been called into question by the insurgency led by its leader, Yevgeni Progozhin.
The GW, founded by a former Russian special forces lieutenant colonel, Dmitry Utkin, in the spring of 2014, during Russia’s annexation of Crimea, and led by the oligarch Yevgeny Prigozhin – who only assumed leadership in January this year – is the most prominent Russian private army controlled by the Kremlin, but not the only one.
More than a dozen private Russian military companies have a presence in Africa, the Middle East, Asia and Latin America, including units equipped with military equipment in Ukraine, the Central African Republic (CAR), Libya, Mali, Sudan, Syria and Venezuela. to a study by the European Union Institute for Security Studies (EUISS) published less than two weeks ago.
The GW operates under the auspices of the GRU – an acronym for Glavnoye Razvedyvatelnoye Upravlenie, Russia’s military intelligence structure), which equips, trains and directs it, despite “ongoing disputes” with the Russian Defense Ministry over strategies, delivery of heavy weapons, ammunition and logistical support, also according to the EUISS document, published ahead of the march of the men led by Prigozhin on Moscow last weekend, which already hinted at the differences and rivalry between the GW leader and Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu.
Since its establishment, The GW has been essential to Moscow’s strategy in combating Western “spheres of influence” and in resuming and expanding its political, economic and security influence on several continents. with special emphasis – in addition to the role it has always played in Ukraine since its inception – in Syria, Libya, the Central African Republic (CAR), Mali, Sudan, South Sudan or Mozambique.
In addition, according to the European Institute of Analysis, the presence of the army of mercenaries led by Prigozhin was also noted in Madagascar, Botswana, Burundi, Chad, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Congo-Brazzaville, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Nigeria, Zimbabwe and the Comoros .
At the beginning of 2016, GW had a total of about 1,000 operators. In August 2017, this number is said to have risen to 5,000 and in December 2017 to about 6,000, according to the EUISS. In January 2023, citing British sources, a Ukrainian news agency estimated the number of GW fighters in Ukraine at 50,000.
About two weeks ago, Die Welt published a file called “WagnerLeaks” based on a leak of information — reports, spreadsheets, etc. — about GW’s activities at RCA, where the group has nearly 1,500 employees.
The documents tell the behind-the-scenes story of Russia’s presence in the Central African country, which contrasts with Moscow’s official discourse.
Between 2017 and 2021, Russian mercenaries, officially deployed as “instructors” of the country’s armed and security forces, continuously expanded their military presence, in total violation of the embargo imposed by the UN on the Central African Republic since 2013.
Accounts written by the mercenaries themselves, and corroborated by various sources, further reveal how the GW looted and sometimes tortured the local population.
The role of the Wagner Group has given the Kremlin two crucial advantages: the victims are invisible at home and the shortfalls of the regular army are largely compensated.
On the other hand, the GW does not formally exist in the letter of the law, for which reason it has hitherto been inexplicable, both in light of the national jurisdictions of the countries where it operates and in light of international law , despite the atrocities of which his mercenaries have been accused, committed in several areas of operations.
In recent days, after Prigozhin’s uprising, the veil on the nature of the group was finally lifted, first by Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov, who stated that the mercenaries will continue to perform the functions of military “instructors” and the leaders in CAR and Mali, and last Tuesday by the Russian president himself.
“We funded this group entirely from the federal budget. Only between May 2022 and May 2023 will the State [russo] paid Wagner companies 86,262,000,000 rubles [cerca de mil milhões de dólares] in cash support and incentive payments,” Vladimir Putin announced.
Enrica Picco, director of the Africa program at the International Crisis Group (ICG), and former member of the UN Panel of Experts for the Central African Republic, explained the diffuse nature of the GW in statements to Lusa, citing as an example the victorious counter-offensive launched by RCA forces and Russian mercenaries in July 2021 against rebel groups.
“Victory was claimed by the then Russian ambassador in Bangui, who claimed that it was Russian troops – the Kremlin forces – supporting the Central African Army, when in fact they were the mercenaries of the Wagner Group,” Picco underlined.
“What was always true was that GW always had operations in CAR, and his mercenaries did not respond to Russian diplomatic officials in the country, to anyone from the Russian embassy in Bangui, or to his military attache,” added Lusa. diplomatic source, on condition of anonymity.
According to ICG researcher”this ambiguity may now benefit the Kremlin and allow a Russian official or Russian official representatives to replace the leaders of the Wagner Group in the field or for trusted people in the Kremlin to take control of the mercenaries in the field to take”, preserving the essence of the structure and in a scenario of Yevgeni Progozhin’s removal from the leadership of the group.
Source: DN
