After all, where were the Russian secret services? Isn’t it strange that the men and Prigozhin himself came so close to Moscow?
There are more questions than answers. The whole process is ambiguous. And, of the two, one: either there was internal knowledge due to effective dissatisfaction with the military and political leaders who made the advance possible; or there was a superior indication that there was no blockage, this is a simulacrum, even if it was involuntary. Or, quite simply, the chain of command is completely unstructured, giving rise to Prigozhin’s tactical advance.
What happened last weekend leaves Russia in great turmoil. Before Gorbachev fell, there was also an internal revolt. Can history repeat itself?
History does not repeat itself, but rhymes, as Mark Twain said. Now it depends on how we read the previous question. That is, this episode should always be read as an index of instability. But I just believe that Putin will use this effort to strengthen his internal power. Note that this could provide scope for reducing domestic criticism of the Kremlin’s handling of the war, opening the door for further internal repression and changes in the chain of command. Therefore, it could be an advantage – with a long-term effect on Russia’s strategy in Ukraine.
Do you think what happened shows that changes are needed in Russia, is the leader on track?
No. As I said, Putin will be able to strengthen his power in the Kremlin. But it will take some time before this becomes clear to us. Renovations, while likely, may not be immediate. In the context of the insurgency, it is possible that Putin will gain more popular and elite support in applying unpopular measures to increase the Russian war effort (war economy, mobilization, pre-emptive arrests of opponents…)
Yevgeny Prigozhin spoke in an audio this Monday. Why should he answer?
Because Wagner and the Kremlin function as a crucial joint venture for Russian foreign policy and hybrid warfare strategy. We cannot just look at Ukraine. They are active in various conflict areas and deeply intertwined with the highest military and diplomatic circles. Wagner is a kind of conglomerate of companies that serves multiple interests. Moreover, Prigozhin is not a populist. He does not want to create animosity. Therefore, it is justified to guarantee or maintain the ability status quo.
Prigozhin gave proof of life and warned that “there is insecurity in Russia”. Sound like a threat?
It can be a warning or a threat. It depends on the reading we do. I come back to the first question.
How do you think the United States and China will view Vladimir Putin from June 24, 2023?
Very carefully. Or there is a power vacuum. Or the possibility of a strengthening of Putin’s power, with repression and unpopular measures, but guaranteeing a long-term strategy for the war in Ukraine. In any case, China did not directly condemn the Wagner group in its support for Putin. And that might give us some perspective on what’s to come.
Source: DN
