Has Russia’s invasion of Ukraine changed the way Germany sees its role in the world?
Definitely yes. Germany was misled. Many assumptions about Russian politics in recent years have been brutally proven wrong. But the government initially managed to respond very quickly. Three days after the invasion, the Bundestag met for a special session and the chancellor proclaimed a Zeitenwende, a turning point in several respects. Germany became willing to supply weapons to a war zone and wanted to spend more than 2% of its GDP on defense in the future to become independent of Russian energy. However, there are now reasons to doubt the consistency of this reconsideration in Germany.
Were you surprised by the lack of negative reactions in other European countries to the announcement of the increase in the German military budget?
No. Germany has been the target of the opposite criticism for years. NATO partners complain that Germany spends too little on defense. Poland and France, victims of Nazi aggression in World War II, also expect Germany to do more. This criticism is still justified because Germany is already breaking its promise again. The country does not spend the promised more than 2% on Defense. And that 2% is also not reflected in the financial planning for the coming years.
How important is it for the European Union to stop Russian expansion?
Existentially important. The more clearly Russia loses the war in Ukraine, the greater will be Europe’s future security. First, the more obvious the defeat, the weaker Russia will be. Secondly, because the deterrent effect is even greater. This also applies to other potential conflicts, such as deterring China from attacking Taiwan.
Is NATO stronger today than it was before February 2022?
Yes, Vladimir Putin achieved the opposite of his goals. He wanted to keep NATO as far away from Russia’s borders as possible. But because of the war in Ukraine, Finland and Sweden decided to join NATO. Previously they had preferred to remain neutral states. But security is a priority for all countries. This means that the Baltic Sea has almost become an inland sea for NATO – with the exception of small coastal areas around the former Königsberg, now Kaliningrad, and St. Petersburg. Furthermore, Finland and Sweden are net suppliers of military security to NATO, unlike other NATO enlargements in previous years.
Could US foreign policy towards Russia change if Trump becomes president again?
Yes, Donald Trump is an isolationist. But I am not so afraid that aid to Ukraine will drop to zero. In the US Senate, both Republicans and Democrats will push for continued aid. On the contrary, the important change is that the US under Trump will no longer be the leader of the pro-Ukrainian international coalition, as it is now under Biden. And no one in Europe can take on this role. This should worry all Europeans. Even today, 78 years after the end of the World War, Europe depends on American leadership – even in a conflict on the European continent.
Biden supports Ukraine and also supports Israel. If there is an intervention by China in Taiwan, is the United States capable of simultaneously becoming involved in a third conflict?
The US could probably manage some combination of these three wars: Ukraine, Israel/Gaza, Taiwan. In general, the US, unlike Europe, imposes on itself the requirement to be able to fight two wars in different parts of the world at the same time. Moreover, there are no American troops on the ground, neither in Ukraine nor in Israel. In general, however, the question arises: how many wars at once would be too many? There could be a situation where Putin, in Russia, or Xi, in China, want to test exactly this. Besides Ukraine, Palestine and Taiwan, other crises could also worsen: in the Balkans, namely in Kosovo, and in Bosnia-Herzegovina; and in the Caucasus, Azerbaijan may be tempted to forcibly seize a land bridge in Armenia to its exclave of Nakhchivan. And the conflicts surrounding Georgia continue to simmer. In Africa, the series of military coups in Mali, Burkina Faso, Guinea and Niger could continue elsewhere.
Despite the improvement in relations with the United States under Biden, should the European Union strengthen its defense component?
Absolute. The European Union is just as economically strong as the US. But militarily they are two different worlds. I see no reason why Europe should not be able to guarantee its own security on its own – and independently of the US. American citizens will not accept having to pay forever for Europe’s security. Today, no one in the world views the EU as a global power on par with the US and China. And no one is afraid of the EU’s ‘hard power’ – because it is not there. Europe must change this. We are entering a time of increasing conflict.
Does the expansion of the European Union make sense?
It depends. Yes, if the EU first reforms itself internally and changes its decision-making mechanisms. And not if the EU is unwilling or unable to implement internal reforms before the next enlargement. We need an end to the national veto and a transition to majority voting. This must be done BEFORE the admission of other states. For me it is a sine qua non. If the EU had more than thirty members and all states had a veto, the EU would not be able to act. It would be political suicide for the EU. But an EU that reformed itself and then expanded to Ukraine and the countries of the Western Balkans and was then able to take action, that EU would be stronger than it is today. That must be the goal.
Without energy security, will the European Union never be a real power?
This is what the consequences of the Russian attack on Ukraine have shown us. Europe needs energy security. But the country should not be open to blackmail in other economic sectors either. We need to map the dependence on rare raw materials and the supply chains. Germany is in the process of drawing up this vulnerability map. And you want to draw conclusions from this, for example, when it comes to approving or refusing foreign investments in strategic areas. I hope that the EU’s partners, and the EU as a whole, will follow a similar approach.
What is the greatest threat to liberal democracy today?
Liberal democracy is threatened in many ways. Especially through radical and populist movements on the right and left. But we must be careful in judging. In some cases, citizens who vote in protest for parties that are clearly right or left of the Center indicate which problems require solutions. Uncontrolled migration, for example. Or a climate policy that does not ask enough about the economic and social consequences of certain climate protection strategies. Citizens rightly expect their governments to guarantee security in the broadest sense: external security, internal security, economic security, social security, but also security of the natural foundations of life. Smart policies must balance all this. I have an allergic reaction when a political movement acts as if there is a single overriding goal to which everything else must be subordinate.
Source: DN
